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I. THE BROWNFIELDS PROBLEM
The owner of a newspaper in Cleveland looked at several
downtown properties for a new production plant. The company
chose an abandoned rail yard on the shores of Lake Erie. Calling
the site "perfect" for its needs, the company spent $60,000 on an
environmental assessment, only to learn that the cost of cleanup
would be prohibitive. The "perfect" site was abandoned and the
new plant, along with its 400 jobs, will open soon, in the suburbs.'
A Chicago metal-stamping firm wanted to expand in the city, but
could not find a large enough urban site without possible
environmental problems. It, too, moved to the suburbs and forty
urban jobs were lost.'
An electrical contractor in Detroit wanted to expand his
existing building onto a neighboring parking lot. He was not, nor
had he ever been, the owner of the parking lot, but his bank
refused to make the necessary expansion loan. Traces of oil,
antifreeze and fuel had dripped onto the lot over the years and the
bank was afraid that it could be held liable for the cleanup of
hazardous waste if it held a security interest in the property.
Instead of expanding in the city, the contractor moved his entire
business to an undeveloped rural area, taking ten jobs away from
urban workers.
Planners and officials in Buffalo and Erie County complain
that they cannot even get business owners to look at urban sites, let
alone invest in the purchase, cleanup and re-use of these sites.
Developers, business owners and manufacturers are all afraid of
what they will find when environmental tests are conducted on
these "brownfield" sites. The term "brownfields" does not refer
1. William Tucker, Industry Goes Where the Grass is Greener: Superfund
Sparks Flight to Suburban Location, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at A9.
2. Richard M. Daley, Wastelands Transformed, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 1994, at
A15.
3. Keith Schneider, Rules Easing for Urban Toxic Cleanups, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 1993, at A12.
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simply to great expanses of abandoned urban wastelands. The
brownfields problem includes small plots of urban land such as
former parking lots and gas stations. Many such sites are only
minimally contaminated but still are passed up for redevelopment.
What has led to this unfortunate situation? And, more importantly,
what can be done?
In 1825, Buffalo became the terminus of the Erie Canal and
the gateway city to the West. By 1850 it was a dominant port and
thriving center of commerce. A century later, in 1950, Buffalo had
grown into a major manufacturing center and transportation
crossroads. Today, just as in numerous other manufacturing cities
across the nation, many of those factories have been tom down or
sit dilapidated on acres of once useful land, leaving aesthetic and
economic blight in the urban core. Many of these abandoned sites
are contaminated with hazardous waste, though the degree of
contamination varies greatly. Other sites, including former parking
lots and gas stations, although perhaps not contaminated, are
ignored by developers and manufacturers because of the possibility
that contamination may be found on the site. Under federal and
state environmental laws, new owners risk being required to incur
the high costs associated with a hazardous waste cleanup. This is
so even if they did not have anything to do with the actual
contamination of the property.
These environmental laws seek to clean up the serious
problem of hazardous waste contamination and put the cost of such
clean up on those who caused it - that is, "make the polluters pay."
Unfortunately, one unintended consequence of these laws is to
discourage the recycling and redevelopment of urban industrial
property. The fear of redevelopment is felt not only by large
industry, but, more importantly, by small business owners seeking
either to start-up or to expand. This is an extremely undesirable
result viewed from both a regional development and environmental
perspective.
Environmental laws are not the only reason that urban
industrial land sits idle, but they clearly are a major factor and thus
a contributor to the well known problems of our urban areas. The
tax base in urban centers has decreased dramatically, triggering a
cycle of negative economic consequences. Many former industrial
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sites are located in low income and minority communities. Failure
to clean these sites perpetuates the existence of health hazards in
depressed urban regions. Because of the difficulty in redeveloping
urban industrial sites, rejuvenation of economies in these areas
through job creation is also significantly hampered.
Instead of minimally contaminated old industrial and
commercial sites being used for new purposes, developers have
located new factories, offices and warehouses in the suburbs,
creating intense development pressure and changing the nature of
many communities. The cost of providing the necessary
infrastructure to support these new developments is strapping the
municipalities and counties in which they are located. The problem
of infrastructure cost is exacerbated by the fact that existing
infrastructure is already in place in the industrial areas where
abandoned and minimally contaminated sites are found. These
infrastructure costs are increasingly being recognized as serious
regional concerns.
Significant negative environmental effects also result from
industrial and commercial unwillingness to redevelop the urban
core. More rural land is being used for industrial purposes than
would be necessary if industries were encouraged to "recycle"
urban industrial properties. The direct effect is that more total land
is "industrialized", even though numerous former industrial sites sit
idle and waste away. If laws could be implemented to encourage
the cleanup and re-use of former industrial property, then less total
land would be impacted. Indirectly, industrialization of outlying
rural and suburban lands creates a greater need for people to drive
to outlying areas to work. This has the negative environmental
effect of promoting greater air pollution and requiring increased
infrastructure development. By making "greenfields" more
valuable for industrial purposes, there is also the potential for
negative economic impact on agriculture, the number one industry
in New York State.
The abandonment of the industrial core (the so-called
brownfields) and the use of open space in suburban and rural areas,
greenfields, constitute a significant environmental and economic
problem in Erie County. The ideal solution would be to take
advantage of the existing infrastructure and recycle brownfield sites
19951
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for new industrial and commercial uses, leaving more greenfields
for agricultural, recreational and residential use.
Significant barriers, however, stand in the way. As a result,
the development and despoiling of outlying greenfields continues
while hundreds of brownfield sites in the core metropolitan area
continue to decay and trigger further urban blight. This report
attempts to identify barriers to the recycling of minimally
contaminated brownfields, and examines different possible means
to the removal of those barriers. The pressing need for law and
policy makers to address the need for brownfield redevelopment is
underscored by the recent number of regional conferences and
reports on the issue.4 The reports are useful in understanding both
the scope of the problem and the breakdown of issues which need
to be addressed in order to begin to solve the it. The coordination
and cooperation of the different conferences and working groups
addressing the issue of brownfield redevelopment is essential.
Indeed, we do not consider this report to be a definitive or
final one. It is but a first step in what must be a long, coordinated
effort by public agencies, private industry, community groups and
environmental advocates to recognize the full reach of the problem
and seek acceptable solutions. It is a difficult and complex
problem for which there are no easy answers. Still, this report
hopes to demonstrate that the brownfield issue is far too important
to be ignored and that successful means of addressing it can, and
in fact, must be developed.
4. This report has referred to the following reports in its research of the
Brownfields redevelopment issue:
(1) Cuyahoga County Plan. Comm'n, Brownfields Reuse Strategies (1993).
(2) Brian Hill and Joanne Denworth, Report on Reuse of Industrial Sites
Roundtable (Pennsylvania Environmental Council, 1993). [hereinafter Cuyahoga
County Report].
(3) Profiles of State Voluntary Cleanup Programs prepared for GE by Stateside
Associates, August 25, 1993.
Subsequent to the release of the original version of our report another report
specifically addressing the issue in New York has been written. Staff Report to
the Chairman, New York State Joint Legislative Commission on Toxic
Substances and Hazardous Wastes, The Voluntary Cleanup of New York's
Contaminated property: Barriers and Incentives (Oct. 1994).
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This report helps define the problem, discusses some
possible strategies that might be used to attack it and suggests the
possibility of many others. All of these approaches require further
study and detail to be actually implemented. This report is,
therefore, an agenda for further action, action that must become
part of an overall policy. To be effective, this policy must reflect
a full understanding of the brownfield problem and the need for a
comprehensive strategy to ameliorate it.
HI. BARRIERS To REDEVELOPMENT
OF BROWNFIELD SITES
Although many barriers5 exist to the redevelopment of
brownfield sites, the major ones are financial and legal. Many
former industrial and commercial sites are contaminated with
hazardous waste generated in the past. Some are uncontaminated
and others only mildly contaminated, but developers are put off by
the risk of liability. Cleanup costs are perceived as prohibitive, or
at least indeterminable, with no assurance that any cleanup effort
will be acceptable to future regulators.
The specific barriers to the recycling of brownfields include:
Risk of liability for past contamination
As discussed later, in Section III, federal environmental law,
most notably the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) 6 has the
effect of imposing strict, joint, several, retroactive and perpetual
liability on virtually all, owners of contaminated property. Liability
for cleanup of hazardous waste is not dependent on fault, causation
5. The list in Section II of this report is by no means an exhaustive list of the
barriers to urban industrial redevelopment. Those included are the major barriers
addressed in this report.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1992).
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or contribution to contamination. Penalties for failure to comply
with payment orders can result in fines of up to $25,000 per day.
Although CERCLA affects only severely contaminated sites, its
liability scheme is so drastic that it has affected the way developers
regard even mildly contaminated sites. Under the federal
Superfund Law the owner of contaminated property is also
considered to be a responsible party for purposes of hazardous
waste cleanup. The New York law is similar in that liability in
New York is not contingent upon fault or contribution to the
hazardous waste contamination on a particular piece of property.
High cost of site assessment and cleanup
The liability associated with industrial land creates a risk of
incurring enormous cleanup costs to return that land to productive
use. The land itself may be inexpensive, but cleanup operations
can be prohibitively expensive and unpredictable. Even the cost of
doing an environmental audit and determining what type of
remediation is required entails significant costs. Given the high
costs of cleanup and the lack of a fixed dollar limit on clean-up
expenses, developers are willing to pay a premium for the
economic security associated with a previously undeveloped site.
Even if the greenfield sites are initially more expensive to buy,
projected costs are fixed and predictable, making the financial
investment seem more prudent. In addition, delay is a serious
concern to developers. Cleanup requirements add another layer of
concern about how quickly a property can be developed.
Uncertain cleanup standards
As explained in Section IV, the broad discretion of state
regulators leaves developers unclear as to the standard to which
they will be held. Where regulators are empowered to require a
cleanup to pre-contamination levels or to permit deviations from
state determined minimum levels, the extent of the final cleanup
cannot be determined prior to considerable negotiations with DEC.
This uncertainty interferes with the rapid estimation of costs
associated with a site cleanup, and an inability to place minimally
BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT
contaminated urban sites in competition with comparable greenfield
sites. Because of the uncertainty, developers are unwilling to
consider cleaning up even vastly devalued urban sites for new uses.
Lack of available public funding for assessment and cleanup
As discussed in Section VI, public money is often
unavailable to assist with the cleanup of brownfield sites. Within
the appropriate framework of an economic development plan,
incentives could be offered on a modest scale. Even something as
minor as a state or municipality assisting with the cost of the
environmental audit and creation of a remediation plan could be
quite important.
Public perception
The atmosphere of confusion and fear that has sometimes
prevailed in the past stands firmly in the way of future brownfield
redevelopment. Community leaders, investors, developers,
environmental groups and the general public all share legitimate
apprehensions that must be addressed and resolved if the recycling
of industrial property is to take place. Environmental
contamination presents numerous frightening possibilities which
cannot be predicted with certainty. There are complex legal and
scientific issues to understand. A lack of information and
communication, an unfortunate history of environmental misdeeds
and a deep public skepticism all contribute to the erection of a
nearly impenetrable barrier. In addition to implementing
substantive legal changes, progress toward safe and prudent
redevelopment necessitates that perceptions be brought into line
with changes that are taking place and that accurate information be
made available.
Lender Liability
Lenders are extremely wary of the risks associated with
brownfield redevelopment. They have three main fears: the
prospect of their own liability for contamination found on land in
19951
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which they hold a security interest; the potential devaluation of
collateral; and the resulting insolvency of the borrower. Lender
liability as an issue unto itself is not addressed in this report.'
Much of the lender liability problem in the brownfields area would
be alleviated by removing liability from innocent new purchasers.
III. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Any potential solutions to the problem of encouraging
brownfield redevelopment must fit within the framework of
existing, pending and proposed federal and state law. It is
important to note that federal and state liability overlap. Release
from liability under one of these does not eliminate potential
liability under the other. This is one of the significant aspects of
both the legal liability and perception problems.
A. Federal Legislative Background
The liability scheme under the federal Superfund statute is
very broad and has been a point of great debate since the
7. John D. Finley, a student in the Fall, 1994 Environment and Development
seminar at the University at Buffalo Law School did research on this issue and
some discussion of this problem is contained in "Testimony of the Environment
and Development Seminar [Fall 1994] University at Buffalo School of Law"
presented at the Hearings on Voluntary Environmental Cleanup and Economic
Development before the Legislative Commission on Toxic Substances and
Hazardous Wastes held in Buffalo, New York on November 18, 1994.
8. Most of this section has been taken from earlier drafts of Comment, Urban
Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and the
Prospects for Change, 43 BuFF.L.Rnv. - (1995), written by Julia A. Solo. The
text and footnotes are either substantially or exactly the same as portions of the
published version of that article.
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legislation's initial passage in 1980.9  Generally, liability is
associated with the land. Hazardous waste facilities are defined
broadly as "any building, structure, installation, equipment... well,
pit, ditch, landfill, storage container... or site where a hazardous
substance10 has been deposited, stored, disposed of or placed, or
otherwise come to be ilocated."11 Courts have also interpreted
"facility" broadly to include "virtually any place at which
9. KATHERINE N. PROBST & PAUL R. PORTNEY ASSIGNING LIABILITY FOR
SUPERFUND CLEANUPS: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS, Resources for the
Future 6-11, 33-41, 44-48 (Resources for the Future Report, Wash. D.C., 1992).
ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, CLEANING UP HAZARDOUS WASTE: IS
THERE A BETTER WAY xvi, VI.A., (Insurance Information Institute Press, 1993)
(proposing abolition of retroactive liability).
Interestingly, even Senators present at the time of the bill's passage
expressed concern about the retroactive nature of the liability structure and the
negative effects which would result to industry, small businesses and the
economy. Frank P. Grad A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980
8 Col.J.Env.L. 1, 14 (1982); S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. at 108-15
(1980).
10. CERCLA, at 42 U.S.C. § 9602, designates hazardous substances as those
designated by EPA or those found in any of four other environmental laws. §
9601(14) states "The term 'hazardous substance' means (A) any substance
designated pursuant to § 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B) any element, compound,
mixture, solution, or substance designated hazardous waste designated pursuant
to § 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics
identified under or listed pursuant to § 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act.
. (D) any toxic pollutant listed under § 1317(a) of title 33, (E) any hazardous
air pollutant listed under § 112 of the Clean Air Act... and, (F) any imminently
hazardous chemical substance of mixture with respect to which the Administrator
has taken action pursuant to § 2606 of title 15. The term does not include
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise
specifically listed or designated as hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A)
through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, or
synthetic gas usable for fuel, or mixture of natural gas and such synthetic gas."
CERCLA's definition of hazardous waste includes over 700 substances. Goodrich
v. Murtha 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992).
11. CERCLA § 101(9)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(A)&(B); see New York v.
Shore Reality Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 n.15 (2d Cir. 1985).
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hazardous wastes have been dumped, or otherwise disposed of"
including roadsides, drag strips and real estate subdivisions. 2
Numerous parties, including almost any party which has
owned or operated the site since its initial exposure to
contamination, or transported waste to the land, may be held liable
for the full cost of cleaning up any hazardous waste release
associated with the site.13 Responsible parties, generally referred
to as Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs), 14 include: (1) present
owners and operators of a facility where hazardous wastes were
released or are in danger of being released; (2) the owners or
operators of a facility at the time the hazardous wastes were
disposed of; (3) the person or entity that arranged for the treatment
or disposal of substances at the facility; and (4) the person or entity
that transported the substances to the facility.15  Inclusion of
12. United States v. Nepacco, 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986);United States
v. Ward 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (D.C.N.C. 1985); see also United States v.
Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. at 162, 185 (D.C. Mo. 1985); New
York v. General Electric Co., 592 F. Supp 291, 296 (N.D.N.Y.1984); United
States v. Metate Asbestos Corp. 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (D. Ariz. 1984).
13. See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a); Florida Power and Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers, 893
F.2d 1313, 1317 (11 th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
1550, 1553-1554 (1lth Cir. 1990).
14. Milton Russell, E. William Colglazier & Mary R. English, Hazardous Waste
Remediation: The Task Ahead, at 29 (Waste Management Research &
Education Institute, Univ. of Tenn., Dec. 1991).
15. The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1992), reads
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section--
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity, at any facility
or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
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present owners in the scheme imposes liability on parties which
may be in no way associated with hazardous waste, particularly
with leaking waste. The present owner of property may well have
purchased it long after waste was disposed or contamination leaked
onto the property.
The liability scheme under CERCLA is strict, joint, and
several.6 It is not specifically set forth in the statute, but has
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for..
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction or loss resulting from
such a release; and(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
carried out under section 9404(i) of this title. See generally, Florida Power and
Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers, 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir., 1990); United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553-1554 (11th Cir. 1990).
16. Frank P. Grad A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980 8
COL.J.ENv.L.1 (1982); see e.g. New York v. Shore Reality Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 (2d Cir., 1985); United States v. Hooker Chems. and Plastics Corp., 680
F. Supp 546 (W.D.N.Y., 1988). The liability scheme under CERCLA is also
retroactive. Liability is and has been imposed on parties who disposed of
contamination years prior to the passage of Superfund. This is so regardless of
whether they used disposal methods which were legal and authorized at the time.
See e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1988)
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. , 680 F. Supp. 546,
556-57 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Shell Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1069-73
(D. Colo. 1985).
There may be a change in the retroactive liability aspect of Superfund.
On March 21, Sen. Rover C. Smith (R-N.H.) and Rep. Bill Seliff (R-N.H.)
"announced [that] they planned to introduce superfund legislation that would
19951
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been interpreted by many courts over the past thirteen years, and
the legislative history has been analyzed repeatedly.17 Fault is not
considered with respect to liability. 8 A similar type of strict
liability has historically been imposed on industries engaged in
ultra hazardous activities. 19 The strict, joint and several liability
standard aims to fulfill the policy objectives of "promot[ing]
fairness, economic efficiency, risk-spreading, and deterrence [to all
parties engaged in the ultra-hazardous activity]." '
The idea behind the liability scheme of CERCLA is to
spread the risks and costs between all parties associated with the
hazardous waste industry, and to simplify the government's ability
to require cleanups at the least possible cost to the government.2'
absolve potentially responsible parties of lability for activities conducted prior to
1980." Elimination of Retroactive Liability proposed by Republicans in Reform
Bill BNA Management Briefing, March 22, 1994.
17. See, e.g. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d
1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991); U.S. v.
Monsanto Co. , 858 F.2d 160, 167 n.11 (4th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore
Reality Corp., 759 F2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Hooker
Chems. and Plastics Corp. 680 F.Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); Violet v. Picillo,
648 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (D.R.I. 1986).
18. See Lynda J. Oswald, Article: Strict Liability of Individuals under
CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 579, 585, 590
(Summer 1993).
19. "One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (emphasis added).
20. Lynda J. Oswald Article: Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A
Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. REV. 579, 592 (Summer 1993).
21. However, Superfund cleanups and lawsuits tend to move slowly, partially
because of the efficiency or lack thereof of large federal bureaucratic agencies,
and partially because of the extent to which PRP's challenge their liability in
court. These challenges often place great delays on cleanups. Transaction costs,
including court fees between insures, PRP's and the government, greatly increase
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The severity of the liability scheme creates an incentive to
financially secure responsible parties to cooperate with one another
and undertake the cleanup on their own.22 And because each of
the four classes of defendants have historically profited from the
production or handling of the waste, the scheme can be seen as
enforcing the "polluter pays" principle.
While the liability scheme may be equitable with respect to
PRP's engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity, 3 its equity
is strained with respect to others. Current owners as well as
purchasers and developers who wish to acquire property subsequent
to contamination will also be buying themselves into CERCLA's
strict liability component. 24 This is true regardless of whether the
new owner contributed to the waste or participated in the
dangerous activity. Whether or not the liability scheme achieves
its ends (i.e. economic efficiency, fairness, deterrence, risk
spreading), it does have the unanticipated effect of discouraging
the cost of cleanup. See KATHERINE N. PROBST & PAUL R. PORTNEY,
ASSIGNING LIABILITY FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY
OPTIONS, at 12 (Resources for the Future) (Wash. D.C., 1992).
22. See Olin Corporation v. Consolidated Aluminum Corporation 807 F.
Supp.1133, 1141 (S.D.N.Y., December 1, 1992)("CERCLA provides an incentive
for PRP's to voluntarily remediate hazards, but, prospectively it also provides a
deterrent to the unsafe release of hazardous materials."); Andrew Ratzkin
Superfund is up to Environmental Task, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR June
22, 1993 at 19 ("CERCLA has been a wild success in grabbing corporate
America by the lapels and enlisting its considerable resources in the remediation
of environmental hazards. . . CERCLA effects self-policing and private-party
cleanup that doesn't cost the government a dime.")
1
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (explaining rationale
behind strict liability).
24. Reed Rubenstein & Mary Field, Clean Up Superfund or Write Off Urban
Redevelopment, CONN. L. TRIB., May 3, 1993 at 20; See generally Superfund
Liability May Add To Urban Sprawl, Congress Told LIABILITY WEEK, No. 17,
Vol. 8, April 26, 1993; See Ellman v. Woo, No.90-0718, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS
18750, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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redevelopment of commercial and industrial sites which do not
present a significant threat to human health or the environment.
In 1986 Congress passed the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act (SARA).2 The most notable difference
between CERCLA and SARA, for purposes of this discussion, is
the innocent landowner defense to liability.26 The innocent
landowner defense 7 is a defense to CERCLA liability for
landowners who purchased land after its contamination and who
did not contribute to the contamination in any way.
The innocent landowner defense applies only to owners who
"unknowingly acquired contaminated property. . . and who
undertook [']all appropriate inquiry['] at the time of acquisition."2 8
According to the statute, the purchaser would need to have had "no
reason to know that any hazardous substance" existed or was
present on the property at the time of purchase in order to be
released of liability.2 9  Therefore, if an environmental audit
25. Sub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613(1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§§
9601-9675 (1988)).
26. The "Innocent Landowner Defense" can be found at § 107(b) of CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
28. SUSAN COOKE, El. AL., EDS., THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE:
MANAGEMENT CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LITIGATION, Vol. 2, 12-17 at §
12.05[2][p] (emphasis added); see CERCLA § 107 (3)(b).
29. The full defense is a combination of 42 U.S.C. 9601 (35)(A)(i) stating that
"at the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and
had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the
release of threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility" and 42
U.S.C. 9607(b)(3)(a) & (b) which states that the release was "caused solely by
... an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant.. .if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned,
taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light
of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that
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conducted prior to purchase revealed any contaminants, the
purchaser would be buying into the liability associated with such
contaminants. °
This defense provides a mechanism to ensure full discovery
of any contamination problems at the time of a sale of property.
As a practical matter, such information is almost always known at
the time of sale. Many states (but not including New York) require
that any finding of contamination on a site must be listed on the
deed so that a sale cannot occur without the purchaser knowing
about such contamination. Most lenders also require that an
environmental audit be conducted on the property prior to agreeing
to a purchase,3 partially because of their own fear of future
liability.32 It is, therefore, almost impossible to purchase urban
industrial land without first having been notified of any chemical
contaminants on the property. Once the buyer has been notified of
contamination, the innocent landowner defense is no longer
available.33 Predictably, the innocent landowner defense has very
rarely been allowed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and has been strictly interpreted by the courts. 34  It does not
address the real brownfields problem of recycling industrial land
that is known to have some contamination.
could foreseeable result from such acts or omissions"; see also Stephen M.
Feldman CERCLA Liability, Where It Is and Where It Should Not Be Going: The
Possibility of Liability Release for Environmentally Beneficial Land Transfers,
23 ENVTL. L. 295, 304 (1993).
30. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168-169 (4th Cir., 1988).
31. Gary Hector, A New Reason You Can't Get a Loan, FORTUNE, Sept. 21,
1992 at 107.
32. Kelley v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied
498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
33. See CERCLA § 107(b); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1992).
34. See Feldman, supra note 29, at 304.
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The innocent landowner defense is basically an "ignorance"
defense. It serves to protect parties who had nothing to do with
causing the contamination, but distinguishes parties who found out
that contamination existed on the property prior to purchase from
those who did not find out. The defense is available only to those
who had no knowledge of the contamination prior to purchase.35
What is the rationale behind the idea that an ignorant non-culpable
party is more "innocent" than a knowledgeable non-culpable party?
In light of the unanticipated effect of discouraging redevelopment
of brownfield sites, the federal government has begun to question
the necessity of holding non-culpable parties liable under
CERCLA. Evidence of this new thinking is indicated by the 1989
promulgation of EPA Regulation 34,235.36
Regulation 34,235 sets forth criteria by which potential
purchasers of contaminated land may be released from liability.
The regulation authorizes the EPA to enter into covenants not to
sue with potential purchasers if:
37
(a) [an] enforcement action is anticipated by the
Agency at the facility; (b) a substantial benefit, not
otherwise available, will be received by the Agency
for cleanup; (c) the Agency believes that., new site
development, with the exercise of due care, will not
aggravate or contribute to the existing contamination
or interfere with the remedy; (d) [d]ue consideration
has been given to the effect which . . . new
development is likely to have on the health risks to
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(A)(1) ("at the time the defendant acquired the facility, the
defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed on, in, or
at the facility." Id. (emphasis added)).
36. 54 Fed. Reg. 34235, III (C), August 18, 1989.
37. Feldman, supra note 29, at 301 n. 31, 317 n. 110 (citing Memorandum from
Edward E. Reich and Jonathon Z. Cannon to U.S. EPA Regional Administrators,
Regional Counsels, and Waste Management Division Directors (June 6, 1989)).
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those persons likely to be present at the site; and (e)
[t]he prospective purchaser is financially viable.38
The EPA seems reluctant to allow property to escape
liability and appears unwilling to do so unless the agency will
realize a substantial benefit.39 The agreement is only applicable
to property which has been scheduled for cleanup by EPA under
Superfund.4' As of 1993, EPA had entered into only four such
prospective purchaser agreements.41 Given this low number, it
seems unlikely that EPA promulgated this regulation with the
intention of stimulating the redevelopment of urban industrial
property.
Current Superfund legislation officially expired on
September 30, 1994,42 . and an initial reauthorization bill was
introduced, but not voted on in 1994.43 Taxes collected from the
chemical industry to finance the Superfund are authorized only
38. 54 Fed. Reg. 34235 § Ill C (a)-(E); See also, Feldman, supra note 29, at
317 note 110, quoting from memorandum from Edward E. Reich & Jonathon Z.
Cannon to U.S. EPA Regional Administrators, Regional Counsels, and Waste
Management Division Directors (June 6, 1989).
39. Feldman, supra note 29, at 317 - 319.
40. 54 Fed. Reg. 34235, § III C. (a), Aug. 18, 1989.
41. Feldman, supra note 29 at 318, n. 112.
42. 26 U.S.C. §§ 59(A), 4611, 4661, 4662; see also Urban Superfund Sites to
be Targeted First, Superfund Week, No. 30, Vol. 6, Issn. 0892-2985 (August 6,
1993); Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Sting and Cleaning Up
Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the
Monster? 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 245 (1991); Clean Up Authority
Extended for Three Years, Tax Authority for Four Years in Budget Bill, 21 Env.
Rep. (BNA) 1243 (Nov. 2, 1990).
43. H.R. 3800, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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through December 31, 1995.44  The Clinton administration's
proposal for Superfund reform45 supports community involvement
in the cleanup process through the establishment of citizen
information and access offices in each state, and community work
groups representing the economic and racial makeup of the
communities. The proposal also addresses issues of environmental
justice and recognizes that often urban residents are faced with
"cumulative [health] risks from multiple sources other than
Superfund sites. ''46 For that reason, the Clinton proposal would
support prioritization of site cleanup based not only on the specific
danger of the Superfund site itself, but also on an integrated
evaluation of the danger from the site and the other environmental
and health dangers faced by the local residents.
The Clinton proposal also supports state voluntary cleanup
programs (discussed in Section IV) and, in order to foster those
programs, recommends the adoption of national cleanup levels and
non site-specific remedies. Liability with respect to a number of
responsible parties is also discussed.
Most notably, the proposal recommends that EPA provide
an exemption from liability to prospective purchasers of
contaminated property. The exemption is contingent upon the
prospective purchasers not aggravating the contamination. In
instances where prospective purchasers would be released from
liability, either the purchasers would have to agree to clean up the
site, or the government would have to clean it. It appears that as
long as a prospective purchaser of a site "conducted a site audit.
. and.., inspection ... provided proper notification of releases
44. 26 U.S.C. §§ 59A, 4611, 4661, 4662; Urban Superfund Sites to be Targeted
First, Superfund Week No. 30, Vol. 6; ISSN: 0892-2985 (August 6, 1993);
Clean Up Authority Extended for Three Years, Tax Authority for Four Years in
Budget Bill, 21 Env. Rep. (BNA) 1243 (Nov. 2, 1990).
45. Summaries of Clinton Administration Proposal for Superfund Reform,
released by EPA [Feb. 3, 1994]. Toxics Law Rep. (BNA) (Feb. 4, 1994)
[hereinafter Clinton Proposal].
46. Clinton Proposal, at 1020.
BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT
of hazardous substances, exercised due care and took reasonably
necessary steps to address the release or threatened release of
hazardous substances and to protect human health and the
environment, and provides cooperation, assistance and site access
to those responsible for response actions,"'47 a liability exemption
would be available. Prospective purchasers must not be affiliated
with liable or responsible parties in any way.
Speculation and uncertainty surround the interpretation of
the due care clause in the above proposal. It is also unclear who
would actually clean up the sites if they are not federal Superfund
sites. If there is only a small amount of low level contamination at
a site, the states may not wish to expend funds on its cleanup,
particularly if there is a backlog of more contaminated sites to
clean first.
Only time will tell if, and in what form, the Clinton
administration proposal will be reintroduced in the 104th Congress.
Its most significant feature is its recognition that a redevelopment
problem exists in urban centers, a problem that is exacerbated by
and must be addressed in changes to federal Superfund legislation.
There will be uncertainty for a while on the federal level, but the
possibility of some significant support for a brownfield
redevelopment strategy exists. Still, as of now, a large part of the
problem of redevelopment of industrial lands remains due to the
very broad and strict liability scheme set up by the original federal
Superfund statute.
B. New York Legislative Background
New York's inactive hazardous waste disposal site
legislation found in the Environmental Conservation Law (ECL)48
differs in significant respects from CERCLA. An "inactive
hazardous waste disposal site" subject to the ECL is "any area or
structure used for the long-term storage or final placement of
48. N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1301 (Consol. 1992)
47. Clinton Proposal at 1024.
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hazardous waste..., '49 for which no permit is in effect. Because
the statute applies only to hazardous wastes, and not all hazardous
substances as are defined under CERCLA, its applicability is
somewhat narrower than CERCLA.
The commissioner of the Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC) may, after notice and an opportunity for a
hearing, order "the owner of such site and/or any person
responsible for the disposal of hazardous wastes at such site'"' to
develop and implement a remedial program for the site. Thus only
the administrative agency can take action against a responsible
party; no cause of action in favor of private parties is created by
the statute.
The statute does not by its terms define who is a
responsible person other than the owner of a site. It merely
provides that the commissioner shall determine who is a
responsible person "according to applicable principles of statutory
or common law liability."0' The DEC has interpreted this
language to authorize imposition of liability on the same categories
of persons who are liable under CERCLA, and has by regulation
defined responsible party to include these categories. 2
The ECL authorizes the commissioner to order the owner
and/or any person responsible for hazardous waste disposal to
develop and implement an "inactive hazardous waste disposal site
remedial program" when "hazardous wastes at [the] site constitute
a significant threat to the environment. 0 3  In 1992, the
department promulgated a new Part 375 with a modified definition
49. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0903 (Consol. 1992).
50. N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1313(3)(a) (Consol. 1992).
51. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1313(4) (Consol. 1992).
52. 6 NYCRR § 375-1.3(u).
53. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 27-1313(3)(a) (Consol. 1992)
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of significant threat to the environment. 4 The regulations, after
listing a series of environmental impacts and factors to be
considered by the commissioner now expressly state that "the mere
presence of hazardous waste at a site or in the environment is not
a sufficient basis for a finding that hazardous waste disposal at a
site constitutes a significant threat to the environment." 55
The statute also allows the department itself to develop and
implement a remedial program for a site, and then seek
reimbursement from a responsible person. The DEC could do this,
for example, when a party fails to obey an order of the
commissioner, where the commissioner is unable to determine who
is a responsible person or locate such a person, or where there is
an imminent danger to the environment or public health under ECL
§ 27-1313(5).
The New York State Superfund program, like the federal
program, includes exacting liability provisions and rigorous cleanup
standards. The focus of Superfund at both state and federal levels
has been the most contaminated sites. This focus has had the
unanticipated effect of leaving many brownfield sites abandoned
and has caused companies to develop greenfields instead. New
York's use of high cleanup standards and unyielding liability
provisions has contributed to the growing brownfields problem.
New York has, however, made recent efforts to encourage
development of certain contaminated properties. At the request of
then Governor Mario Cuomo, a pilot program was developed by
the New York Urban Development Corporation (UDC) in
cooperation with the DEC. The goal of the program was to match
five sites suitable for industrial or commercial use with potential
developers who would be willing to pay for the cleanup and whose
business would have a positive economic impact on the
community. Once an appropriate match was made, the potential
developer would present a remediation plan for DEC approval.
The end result would be a consent decree that protects the
54. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1313(3)(b) (Consol. 1992).
55. 6 NYCRR § 375-1.4.
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company from future liability for the contamination cleaned up
under the remediation plan. Contamination caused or discovered
after execution of the consent decree would not be covered by the
agreement. Financing for the cleanup would be the exclusive
responsibility of the developer. However, a business expansion
loan, infrastructure investment loan/grant combination and/or grants
for the study of the nature and extent of contamination might be
available through the UDC.
56
The pilot program sought to demonstrate the opportunities
available under New York's current legislative scheme. Success of
the program would clearly be a significant accomplishment for the
companies involved as well as the affected communities. It further
suggests that there may be informal mechanisms already in place
to facilitate the development of industrial sites where a company
is willing to undertake a cleanup in order to acquire a site.
However, it is less clear that the success of a program which
affects a small number of sites on a special basis can lead to the
kind of broader change of perception that will induce companies to
consider the possibility of developing former industrial sites in the
regular course of business. A company's decision to clean up a
former industrial site for commercial or industrial redevelopment
must be an economic one based on as much certainty as possible.
Clear procedures are necessary so that potential developers can
accurately and efficiently determine the cost of redeveloping a site.
Legislative codification of this policy would give industry a
measure of security in its dealings with DEC.57
The New York State Senate Legislative Commission on
Toxic Substances and Hazardous Wastes drafted legislation that
56. See Letter to Edward Farrell, of the New York State Conference of Mayors
from Mary Musca, Vice President for Policy and Planning with the New York
State Urban Development Corporation (April 6, 1994). For a discussion of the
four actual test projects that were used, see Robert S. Berger, Brownfields: The
New York Approach, 6 ENVTL. LAW IN NEW YORK 1, at 13-14 (January 1995).
57. DEC has recently developed its own voluntary cleanup plan. N.Y. DEC
Organization and Delegation Memorandum #94-32. For a discussion of this
plan, see Berger, supra note 57.
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was 'introduced in the State Senate that would formally set up what
is commonly referred to as a voluntary cleanup program.58 This
program, like many others across the nation, would create
procedures through which a company could assess the
contamination at a given site and submit a remediation plan to
DEC. If the plan is sufficient, DEC would agree that, upon
satisfactory completion of the proposed cleanup, it would certify
the site and enter into a covenant not to sue the company for
contamination covered by the remediation plan. This legislation
would formally codify what can be achieved through the type of
informal negotiations with DEC contemplated in the UDC pilot
program, but would apply to a much broader range and number of
properties.59
IV. LESSENING THE UNCERTAINTY OF
BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT:
LIABILrrY AND CLEANUP STANDARDS
A. General Dimensions of Liability
The liability scheme under federal environmental legislation
(most significantly CERCLA, 42 USC § 9607(a)) and New York
State environmental law (most notably Title 13 of the New York
Environmental Conservation Law § 27-1313) is one of the major
inhibitors to redevelopment of industrial and commercial property.
Under both sets of laws, any person owning or operating a facility
or a business of any type can be held one hundred percent liable
for the cost of any necessary cleanup. Also, under CERCLA and
New York State statutes, the liability is strict, and, therefore,
liability can be imposed regardless of who caused the
contamination.
58. S.B. 7787, 215th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., 1994 New York Laws.
59. For a discussion of the actual proposed legislation, see Berger supra note
57, at 14-15.
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Liability can be discussed on a number of different levels.
As noted above, all parties owning or operating a site can, in most
instances, be held liable for contamination found on the land,
whether or not they contributed to the contamination. However, in
some limited situations there are exceptions. For instance,
municipalities which acquire land through tax foreclosure, will not,
under federal law, be held accountable for cleanup of hazardous
substances. Redevelopment of urban industrial areas could perhaps
be instigated more easily if municipalities, under appropriate
circumstances, could pass this exemption on to business owners
willing to undertake the cleanup. Unfortunately, there is no
corresponding municipal exemption under New York law. The
feasibility of incorporating municipal liability exemptions into
state law, and of passing on exemptions through lease or purchase,
will be thoroughly discussed in Section V.
The liability associated with industrial land creates a risk of
enormous cost for potential developers. The price of even a small
cleanup can run into the millions. Developers will inevitably
hesitate before purchasing land that could be contaminated, even if
there is only the slightest risk that they will be held liable. Even
the cost of doing an environmental audit and determining what type
of remediation is required entails great expenditure.
In order to promote cleanup and reuse of land in industrial
urban areas, it is essential to implement changes in the liability
scheme. Of course, any changes must be fair and must not negate
the basic "polluter pays" principle.
B. Voluntary Cleanup Programs
Liability. The primary examples of liability exemptions for
non-municipal, current owners or prospective purchasers of
contaminated property can be found in programs throughout the
United States generally referred to as voluntary cleanup programs.
Though the term "voluntary cleanup" is used commonly, voluntary
cleanup programs vary greatly from state to state.
Their basic purpose is to promote redevelopment through
legislative changes which encourage current owners and prospective
purchasers to clean up contaminated property. Most voluntary
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cleanup programs focus on property which is only mildly
contaminated and which is not on either the federal National
Priority List or a state listing. A small number of programs give
special preference to property located in depressed urban areas.
Priority is frequently given to new uses which will create the
greatest number of jobs and have the largest potential to increase
tax revenue.
In addition to possible financial incentives, discussed in
detail in Section VI, most state voluntary cleanup programs offer
some form of liability release to new owners who have successfully
completed an approved cleanup. Depending on the form and
inclusiveness of the liability release, the voluntary cleanup program
may have different degrees of success.
State governments, however, are unlikely to issue a
covenant not to sue or a release of liability to anyone, even a new
purchaser, until the contamination is cleaned up. In order to
determine that the land is, in fact, clean, or as clean as the
government requires it to be, unified and definitive cleanup
standards should be implemented. Clearly delineated cleanup
standards will also help in creating a realistic remediation plan.
Cleanup standards will be discussed in detail in the following part
of this section.
It is essential to remember that amendments to New York's
environmental law will not change the liability structure under
federal law. Under CERCLA, new owners could still be held liable
for future cleanup costs, whether or not they contributed to the
contamination. CERCLA is actually only likely to affect the most
severely contaminated sites in the nation. The federal law would
be unlikely to have any actual effects on new owners of mildly
contaminated urban property, even if the proposed federal
amendment is not enacted.
There are two major reasons for this. First, the sites
focused on for purposes of this report are minimally contaminated
sites. Such sites would, in most cases, not be listed on the state
registry. In other words, the level of contamination at the sites
would not be severe enough to have qualified the property for state
action. Federal action is usually taken at more severely
contaminated sites than those on state listings. The sites with
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federal priority are listed on the National Priority List. Because the
sites which are the focus of this report would have made it to
neither the state nor the federal priority list, chances are slim that
they will ever be the target of a federal Superfund action.
Therefore, the federal liability scheme should actually have
minimal effect on developers, and a change in the state liability
scheme should spark development of the urban centers.
The second reason the federal liability scheme should not
pose a great threat to potential developers of urban industrial land,
is that under a proposed state voluntary cleanup plan, a site would
have to be cleaned before being re-used. The chance of a
remediated site being targeted under Superfund is extremely small.
Over a thousand severely contaminated sites have been on the
National Priority List for years, and, due to constraints of time and
money, the federal government is having difficulty dealing with
even those. There simply is no time for the federal government to
seek out minimally contaminated and previously cleaned sites.
A threat posed by CERCLA's drastic liability scheme is fear
of its magnitude. Once pilot programs and projects get started in
which businesses are actually encouraged to redevelop in urban
areas, the perception of the danger of CERCLA liability for these
properties may begin to dissipate. New York state's pilot program,
for instance, is one way to dispel some of the fear and negative
public perception about redevelopment.
There is, of course, a chance that federal Superfund
reauthorization will incorporate liability releases for prospective
purchasers. As explained in Section III liability releases for
prospective purchasers of commercial property are included in the
Clinton Administration's reauthorization bill.
In order to preserve the underlying purpose behind state and
federal environmental laws, protection of public health and the
environment, this report recommends that liability releases be given
only in situations where the interested purchasers are willing to
clean up the properties, or where the properties will be cleaned by
some combination of state, local and private money. Releases of
liability should only be given in situations where the proposed new
use of the property will not contribute to or exacerbate the
previously existing problem. If some small traces of contamination
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are found on the property, but the property still conforms to all
state standards of safety, the new owner could be released from
potential future liability for previously existing waste even without
a cleanup being implemented. Again, this should be dependent
upon the new use not exacerbating the condition of the property.
Although some proposals suggest privatization of state regulatory
oversight duties, this report does not support the placement of the
responsibility for determining whether a developer has fulfilled its
cleanup duties in the hands of a private party. The DEC should
approve any cleanup before allowing a release from liability.
Many legislatures in other states have enacted various
forms of liability releases under their voluntary cleanup programs
for new owners or prospective purchasers of contaminated property.
The theories behind such legislative changes are to promote reuse
of industrial land, to ensure a more equitable liability structure,
and, in some cases, to promote urban redevelopment and job
creation in depressed areas.
There are three basic types of liability releases that have
been offered by other states. For any of them to be implemented
in New York, some coordination between the DEC and private
business owners would be required. Each of the liability releases
is similar, but represents a different level of relief.
No Further Action Letter. If a private party is interested in
a certain piece of industrial property, that private party or possibly
the state, as part of a financial incentive program, could undertake
a site assessment. If remedial action is required on the property,
the state would give a specific indication of the level of
remediation necessary for issuance of a no further action letter.
A no further action letter is granted only after cleanup has
been done, or if the state determines that no cleanup is required.
It does not release the new owner from liability, but does guarantee
that the state will not open or reopen the site, barring discovery of
new information unknown at the time of letter.
Where an approved cleanup has been completed, a no
further action letter is simply a promise by the state not to require
further remediation. This means that if cleanup standards change,
the new owner will not be required to redo the cleanup. Also, if
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new cleanup technologies are developed, the new owner should not
have to fear disruption of normal business caused by further
remediation.
A no further action letter does not guarantee that no further
action will be required if new wastes are discovered on the
property or if waste is found to be leaking onto a different part of
the property than that previously cleaned.
Covenant Not to Sue. A covenant not to sue is granted after
cleanup. It provides protection from future state suits for
contamination found on the property, but does not cover conditions
that were unknown at sign off.
A covenant not to sue is one step beyond a no further action
letter. A covenant not to sue would probably be somewhat more
effective than a no further action letter in terms of public
perception. New owners are likely to feel more comfortable with
the knowledge that the state will not reopen a suit or make them
parties to a suit in the future.
Such a covenant only covers the cleanup actions already
taken on the site. The best covenants would protect the new
owners from state suits for any waste previously existing on the
property. Covenants not to sue may require that the new or
potential purchaser of the property indicate the intended new use
of the property. The state would then have to approve of the
intended use before offering the covenant. In that respect, the state
is assured that the new use will not exacerbate the previous
contamination. Certain restrictions could be placed on the deed to
the property limiting future uses of the site.
Certificate of Release. Certificates of release are essentially
the same as covenants not to sue. The name is not as important as
the idea of limited liability for a new owner who proposes to reuse
an industrial site for a productive purpose and who takes approved
actions to clean up a site. A covenant not to sue or a certificate of
release would be offered only in a situation where there was a
substantial degree of state oversight of the cleanup. Neither would
be offered until the state has inspected the site and approved the
cleanup.
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In no further action letters, covenants not to sue and
certificates of release, the protection is only offered for
circumstances known about at the time of cleanup. This important
limitation is incentive for the new owners or purchasers to discover
and remediate all known conditions on sites, rather than try to
cover them up, because they will be guaranteed protection only for
contaminants initially discovered.
Liability Release. A liability release may be granted prior
to cleanup. It may be use-dependent, so as not to exacerbate
existing contamination. It is conditional on an intention to clean
and reuse the site and granted only to parties having no connection
whatsoever to parties responsible for the contamination at the site
(PRPs). This form of liability release may be passed along to
subsequent owners or operators on the property.
The most comprehensive liability release plan is a voluntary
response program currently in place in Minnesota. New owners or
prospective purchasers can obtain financial assistance in connection
with a site assessment. They can then submit a plan to the
environmental commissioner announcing the cleanup proposed for
the site and the proposed new use of the property. After the
commissioner approves the plan, the private party undertakes the
cleanup. After the cleanup, new parties will be released from all
liability, providing they are in no way connected with the
responsible parties. The release and any deed restrictions will run
with the land, and, therefore, apply to all subsequent owners and
lessees as well as to lenders.
The adoption of any of these forms of liability relief would
assist New York to encourage businesses, both industrial and
commercial, to recycle industrial property without jeopardizing the
health and safety of local residents or of the environment.
Adoption of a liability release plan would have the most long term
and comprehensive effect. In any event, the relief from liability
should run with the land and insulate later purchasers.
No further action letters, covenants not to sue and liability
releases can be created or granted in a number of different ways,
as there are no standard definitions of these terms. Legislators can
incorporate desirable portions of each release into one bill. For
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instance, if New York was willing to grant covenants not to sue
after cleanup, they may wish to have the covenant run with the
land, as liability releases often do.
All three types of releases are generally granted to
prospective purchasers and certain owners of industrial property
who take on remediation of that property. Therefore, cleanup to
some specified standard is required. A full discussion of the need
for the adoption of practicable and ascertainable cleanup standards
is required in order to complete a discussion of voluntary cleanup
programs and their effectiveness in removing uncertainty and
inducing urban industrial redevelopment.
C. Cleanup Standards
Cleanup standards are the most complicated and contentious
issue in relation to voluntary cleanups in general and New York in
particular. New York's present cleanup standards are some of the
most stringent in the nation. They are based on the condition of
the property prior to the contamination of the site and are often
referred to as prior use standards.
Clean-up standards in New York State are found in the
remedy selection regulations of N.Y. COMe. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
6, section 375-1.10 (1992) [N.Y.C.R.R.]. The goal of the program
is "to restore [the] site to pre-disposal conditions, to the extent
feasible and authorized by law., 60 The minimum requirement is
the elimination or mitigation of "all significant threats to the public
health and the environment presented by hazardous waste disposed
at the site through the proper application of scientific and
engineering principles.",6' The regulations require that the
remedial design be selected based on several factors. Stringent
federal cleanup standards are integrated into the state requirements.
Section 375-1.10(c)(1)(iii) states "the terms 'standards and criteria'
and 'guidance' include both those of this State and those of the
60. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 375-1.10(b) (1992).
61. Id.
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United States to the extent that they are more stringent than those
of this State." There is a specific preference for "[a] site specific
remedy that permanently and significantly reduces the volume,
toxicity, and/or mobility of the hazardous wastes.,6 2  The
following is the "hierarchy of remedial technologies:"
(i) destruction, onsite or offsite
(ii) separation/treatment, onsite or offsite
(iii) solidification/chemical fixation, onsite or offsite
and
(iv) control and isolation offsite or onsite.
The remedial program must "conform to standards and criteria...
unless good cause exists why conformity should be dispensed
with. 63
The effect of the New York standards is to provide the DEC
with the widest possible discretion to either require an extensive
cleanup or a more limited cleanup. The DEC attempts to remediate
the contamination at a given site to the maximum standard - the
condition prior to contamination. A PRP will generally attempt to
convince DEC to require the minimum standard - the point where
the site no longer represents a "significant threat to the public
health and the environment."
The DEC should certainly have significant discretion to
demand extensive cleanups from unwilling participants in the
cleanup process, who act to avoid fines and equitable sanctions.
Different cleanup standards may be appropriate for those who are
not responsible for contamination at the site, but who might be
willing to undertake a cleanup in order to use the land. A private
developer needs a very clear indication of what a cleanup will
require and some assurance that the requirements will not change
after work has begun. The DEC has significant discretion to
approve appropriate remedies. However, without more specific
guidelines it is very difficult for a potential developer to anticipate
to what standard it will be held. This uncertainty is aggravated by
62. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 375-1.10(c)(1)(iii)(5).
63. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 375-1.10(c)(1)(i).
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the diverging interests of the DEC and the prospective developer
(i.e. clean vs. cost). It directly interferes with the feasibility of the
use of the property by the prospective developer. Bargaining
positions seldom provide a reliable indication of the actual final
negotiated cost. The more disparate the bargaining positions the
more uncertainty associated with the transaction and the higher the
cost. It is very important that a developer be able to accurately
forecast the costs associated with a proposed property in order to
compare that property to competing alternative properties, typically,
available greenfield sites. Time is also an important element; any
time that a business must wait to purchase and use a property
represents a cost of acquiring that property.
In order to encourage the redevelopment of contaminated
land, many states have tried to lower the costs associated with
indefinite cleanup standards. The goal is generally to narrow the
ground between the DEC or its equivalent and the prospective
developer through legislation. The practical result is not dirty sites
but more predictability for potential developers. Such new
standards recognize that site specific criteria such as future land use
and proximity of potential sources of drinking water are always
appropriate factors in choosing a remedy. The goal of returning
sites to their pre-contamination condition is not entirely abandoned.
States have simply recognized that environmental agencies look to
certain criteria in choosing an appropriate remedy in light of
potential exposures and available technology. To suggest that those
criteria should be limited to the pre-contamination condition of the
site misleads not only the public but potential developers whose
assistance in the cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated sites
is indispensable.
Legislation affecting cleanup standards in many states offers
a choice of standards. Legislation has been introduced in
Pennsylvania that would significantly change cleanup standards for
voluntary cleanups in that state.64  Under the proposed
Pennsylvania legislation a developer would have three sets of
standards from which to choose.
64. S. 972, Leg. Sess., 1994 Pennsylvania Laws 1.
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Background Levels. Background Levels represent the more
stringent standard. Background levels are defined as the greater of
"background as represented by the results of analyses of
representative samples; or the achievable practical quantitation
limit." The Practical Quantitation Limit is the "lowest level that
can be reliably attained within specified limits of precision and
accuracy under routine laboratory conditions. '65 If these levels
are yet insufficient to satisfy applicable statewide health standards,
which would be minimum health standards developed by the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, those more
stringent standards would need to be met. For example, conditions
at a site could make even the presence of an otherwise benign
contaminant dangerous, especially where drinking water is
involved. Every cleanup would have to "result in reducing the risk
to public health and the environment. "66
It would be necessary to provide notice of intent to use
these standards to the Department of Environmental Resources, the
local municipality and the local public. Use of these standards
would avert the necessity for deed restrictions; the property would
be deemed clean for any future use.
Statewide Health Standards. Statewide Health Standards
which would be developed by the Department of Environmental
Resources in order to "protect ground water and prevent
contaminated soil from exposing the public to harm. "67 These
standards are connected to use and exposure and can lead to deed
restrictions. The public notification requirements are the same for
these standards as for background levels.
Site Specific Standards. Site Specific Standards are set on
a case by case basis only after a detailed site investigation is
performed. Resulting cleanup standards are tied directly to the
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2.
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future use of the site and the actual exposure risks. Such standards
typically involve deed restrictions that limit the future use of the
property to protect against recontamination or disruption of
marginally contaminated soil. Application of these standards
typically requires considerable negotiation with the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources [DER] which has the
discretion to alter standards at the specific site where there are
grounds for doing so. A large number of cleanups require
application of this standard to address problems of feasibility.
Whichever of these three standards is chosen, the local
community must be given the opportunity to participate at each
step in the process. Typically a local advisory committee would be
set up which would have access to documents and would have the
opportunity to participate in public meetings.6
8
The proposed Pennsylvania cleanup standards represent only
one attempt to redefine cleanup standards for those companies
willing to take on a cleanup voluntarily. Legislation adopted in
Massachusetts,69 Michigan, Texas and Ohio, specifically permits
the use of different standards for residential and industrial uses.
70
The Ohio legislation specifically authorizes development of
property with residual contamination within certain limits where
remediation is technically infeasible.7' Such contamination would
be recorded on the deed. Because permitting certain minimal
levels of contamination to remain on a property is also the practical
68. Id.
69. See Deirdre C. Menoyo, State Program Launched to Encourage
Redevelopment of Contaminated Sites, MASSACHUSETTS LAWYERS WEEKLY, Oct.
10, 1994, at 41 and Mark A. Cohen, Interest High in Program to Promote
Polluted-Land Sales; But Some Say 'No-Sue" Covenant Not Enough,
MASSACHUSErrs LAWYERS WEEKLY, Dec. 26, 1994, at 1.
70. Stateside Associates, PROFILES OF STATE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAMS,
CLEANUP STANDARDS (1993) (Updates were provided by Mark Anderson of
Stateside Associates; for further information he can be reached at (703) 525-
7466).
71. Id.
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effect in the many states which use site specific risk assessment
standards, appropriate deed restrictions are necessary.
It is important to distinguish these modified cleanup
standards from the standards to which companies who were in
some way involved in the contamination of a property, or
"polluters", are held. States that have changed cleanup standards
for voluntary cleanups have not done so in order to permit culpable
companies to escape their responsibility under the law. They have
merely recognized that companies who willingly cleanup
contamination for which they are not responsible should be treated
differently than companies who reluctantly conduct a cleanup as a
result of a costly adversary process.
This is especially true where consent decrees are entered
into by PRPs who elect to clean contamination as an alternative to
incurring the cost of a state financed cleanup. Such consent
decrees, as a practical matter, permit clean up of sites to an
economically and technically feasible level. The question is
whether goals that are set to provide the state with the legislative
authority to negotiate an appropriate level of remediation for a
reluctant party should be the same as those designed to encourage
a company to volunteer to undertake a cleanup that might
otherwise never occur under the adversary system. Such sites
include those that never make the National Priority List (NPL) or
the state registry as well as those that have made a priority list but
are not of a high enough priority to receive funding due to budget
constraints. Under the present system certain minimally
contaminated sites may never receive the funding necessary to
effect an actual cleanup.
V. LTABILrrY EXEMPTIONS FOR MUNICIPALLY
OWNED PROPERTY
Special consideration should be afforded property acquired by
municipalities and indeed it is already treated differently under
federal law. Often this may be property abandoned by an owner
who stopped paying property taxes and allowed the property to be
19951
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acquired by tax foreclosure. Foreclosure may be the result of the
fact that the property cannot be sold because the cost of cleaning
it up exceeds its value. Or, the property may be relatively clean,
but the fear of possible liability still reduces its value to a negative
net worth. This is an important part of the brownfields problem
and one in which municipalities could play a special role because
they have some limited immunity from liability. If this immunity
could somehow be passed on to a prospective developer pursuant
to an appropriate scheme that does not compromise any
fundamental goals, a major obstacle to recycling some of this land
could be overcome. Indeed, with the appropriate restrictions it
even might be legitimate to extend such an arrangement to land
that a municipality acquires by eminent domain for the specific
purpose of brownfield redevelopment.
The discussion of this possible role for municipally owned
land needs to be broken down into its separate components, with
a discussion for both federal and state law. The first issue is
whether there is any municipal exemption for ownership of land
acquired by different means. The second question is whether there
is any method by which any such exemption could be passed on to
an innocent prospective developer.
A. Municipal Ownership Alternatives
Involuntary Acquisition by Tax Foreclosure. At the federal
level, CERCLA currently provides immunity to municipalities
which acquire ownership or control of a piece of property
involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment or
other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires
title by virtue of its function as sovereign.72 No further action,
therefore, needs to be taken to ensure municipal immunity under
circumstances of involuntary acquisition and federal law appears
generally to include tax foreclosure in the involuntary category.
Quite a different situation exists, however, at the state level.
The law of New York merely allows the municipal owner to apply
72. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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for financial assistance for the clean up of hazardous waste, if
certain provisions apply. There is no release from liability.
However, the municipality can get financing from the 1986
Environmental Quality Bond Act for seventy-five percent of the
cleanup.73 There are various additional requirements beyond mere
municipal ownership to receive the funding, though, including the
presence of a significant threat to health. The applicable state
regulation states that a municipality may apply for financial
assistance if the site represents a significant threat and the
municipality acquired title to the property either involuntarily or
before it was listed on the registry.7' The difference between New
York's and the federal Superfund's statutory scheme is this
exemption from liability. Whereas New York is willing to help
finance the cleanup, it preserves municipal liability making state
law more stringent than CERCLA in this regard.
Superfund laws of some states exempt municipalities from
liability, following the lead of the federal government. For
example, Minnesota has passed the Minnesota Environmental
Response and Liability Act75 which specifically exempts
municipalities from liability.76 There is also legislation in
Wisconsin which specifically exempts a municipality from
liability.77
The Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability
Act78 details and discusses hazardous waste, hazardous waste
facilities, liable parties, property owners, cleanup funds, removal
and remediation. According to the legislation, "the state, an agency
73. N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 52-0303 (Consol. 1993).
74. 6 NYCRR § 375-3.2(b).
75. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.01 (West 1987).
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.03 Subd. 4(a) (West 1994).
77. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.76(9)(Im.a.) (West 1994).
78. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.01 - 115B.24 (West 1994).
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of the state, or a political subdivision that may be considered an
owner of tax forfeited real property is not a person responsible for
a release or threatened release from a facility in or on the
property. '7 9 This seems to exempt the state or municipality from
liability for tax foreclosed land.
Wisconsin has legislation dealing specifically with tax
delinquent contaminated land as well. For the most part, the
Wisconsin act pertains specifically to municipally held land,
providing that a municipality is not liable for the damages caused
by the release of a hazardous substance on property, whenever
acquired, if the property is acquired:
(a) through tax delinquency proceedings or as the result
of an order by a bankruptcy court; or
(b) from a municipality that acquired the property
through tax delinquency proceedings or as a result
of an order by a bankruptcy court.
These provisions specifically exempt the municipality."0
Tax foreclosure proceedings are the most common type of
involuntary acquisition. In New York, there was some uncertainty
over whether a taxing body is required to take tax delinquent land
by foreclosure after a statutory period of time or whether it is at
the municipality's discretion. However, the apparent practice of
New York counties and municipalities is to indefinitely delay
taking title to land about which they have environmental concerns
since there seems to be no requirement as to when the taxing body
must take title to the property after the redemption period. The
New York State Legislature has ostensibly dealt with this issue by
revising Title 11 of the Real Property Tax law, which became
effective January 1, 1995. Of greatest importance is the expansion
of the available exclusion for properties which municipalites
consider unattractive foreclosure candidates. The revised exclusion
of Section 1138 applies to any piece of real property which, "if the
79. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.03. Subd.4(a) (West 1994).
80. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.76(9)(Im.a.) (West 1994).
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tax district were to acquire the parcel, there is a significant risk that
it might be exposed to liability substantially in excess of the
amount that could be recovered by enforcing the tax lien.""1
Although this seems to be a plausible solution to the legitimate
concern of municipalities, it fails to address the heart of the issue
and may only exacerbate the brownfields problem in New York.
Clearly, the federal law under CERCLA provides immunity
for municipalites which acquire title to property involuntarily.82
The language of the federal statute equates tax foreclosure to an
involuntary acquisition. However, as evidenced by the recent
amendment to the New York State tax law, the current practice in
the state raises the possibility that foreclosure of contaminated land
may be viewed as a voluntary acquisition of title. Not only does
this amendment symbolize the tragic, albeit unintended, policy
results that occur when the overall scope of the brownfields
problem is not recognized, but it also increases concerns that the
New York State tax foreclosure process may be seen as a voluntary
acquisition of property for which municipalites are not afforded the
exemption provided under CERCLA.
The significance of the apparent discretion afforded to
municipalities and the exclusion of inactive hazardous waste sites
from the list of real property to be foreclosed is clear. If a
municipality is not required to take known contaminated land, then
it is unlikely to do so because the acquisition of such property may
subject the municipality to clean-up liability by a state which has
no municipal exemption. As a result, such property continues in
legal limbo with little likelihood of being cleaned up and recycled.
The first step in a coordinated brownfields approach is to change
New York law to provide an appropriate exemption from liability
for municipal property acquired by tax foreclosure.
Voluntary Acquisition by Eminent Domain. There is
somewhat contradictory language embodied in the language of the
81. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw § 1138(1)(d) (Supp. 1993).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1982 & Supp.IV 1986).
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original federal CERCLA statute and that of the SARA83
amendments as to whether voluntary acquisitions by a municipality
still qualify for CERCLA immunity. Under the definitional terms
and language of the original statute, a municipality is exempt only
under involuntary situations." However, under the language of
the SARA amendments, property acquired by means of eminent
domain pursuant to a legitimate brownfields clean up program is
included in a special immunity provision. 5
New York has no present immunity for a municipality that
takes title to land through eminent domain. Other states have
granted such immunity to municipalities. One state that has such
a proactive program is Minnesota. In Minnesota, a state, agency
of the state, or political subdivision that acquires property through
an exercise of the power of eminent domain or through negotiated
purchase after filing a petition for the taking of the property
through eminent domain, or through adoption of a redevelopment
or development plan, is exempt from liability.86
In New York, since a taking by eminent domain is a
voluntary choice, a municipality that acquires property in this way
is not even eligible for funding to remediate the site. Because
eminent domain authority might be an appropriate tool to address
part of the brownfields problem, the possibility of a municipal
exemption for property acquired by eminent domain should receive
further consideration.
B. Transferring Immunity
Sale. Under the terms of the federal law there appears to
be no permissible transfer of immunity from a municipality to a
83. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat.1613 (1986).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1.982 & supp. IV 1986).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(ij)
86. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.03. Subd.5 (West 1994).
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purchaser simply by execution of a transaction between parties for
the sale of land or property. 7 Without such immunity, the
purchaser would be a liable party as an owner.
Some states have addressed the transfer of immunity issue.
New York, though, is not among them. One state which allows the
transfer of a municipal exemption is Minnesota. The Minnesota
Environmental Response and Liability Act8 states that a person
who acquires property from the state, agency of the state or a
political subdivision, is not a responsible party solely as a result of
the acquisition of property if the property was acquired by eminent
domain. This immunity is thus transferable to future purchasers.
This is an example of what could be done in New York State,
though it must be carefully considered to ensure that true polluters
are paying their fair share and no unfair financial burden falls on
municipalities.
Lease. Even if federal law does not authorize the transfer
of municipal liability upon the sale of land to a purchaser, it may
be possible to facilitate redevelopment of used industrial properties
in Erie County by having the county acquire title to the property
87. The basis of this conclusion stems from the absence of any statutory
language explicitly stating permission for such transfer, any case law which
would indicate acceptance by the courts of such a transaction, and some
contradictory case law which states that courts are unwilling to frustrate the
intent of CERCLA, which this certainly might. See e.g., New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d cir. 1985) (stating that the court "will not
interpret section 9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates [CERCLA's]
goals, in the absence of a specific congressional intention otherwise"); United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573, 578-79 (D. Md. 1986)
(interpreting section 107(a) (1) of CERCLA loosely and section 9601(20) (A) of
CERCLA narrowly to bring the defendant within the definition of a "covered
person"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112
(D. Minn. 1982) (stating that "CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal
construction. CERCLA should not be narrowly interpreted to frustrate the
government's ability to respond promptly and effectively, or to limit the liability
of those responsible for cleanup costs beyond the limits expressly provided.")
88. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.01 (West 1994).
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and execute a lease to the developers of the property. The premise
behind such an arrangement is that the immunity afforded
municipalities under the federal Superfund law might likewise
prevent such law from reaching lessees of such property, thus
shielding innocent developers from federal Superfund liability.
While such a premise is attractive, it is untested. It is unclear,
therefore, whether CERCLA liability would attach to such a lessee.
Under CERCLA, a lessee, in some situations, may be liable
as an "owner or operator. '89 The fact that courts are more willing
to interpret the language of CERCLA in favor of liability raises
difficult problems with lessor/lessee arrangements between an
immune lessor and a lessee entered into with the intention of
avoiding CERCLA liability of the lessee. Under what
circumstances will a lessee be considered an "owner" or an
"operator" and what factors will a court look to in making such a
determination?
Although the definition of "owner or operator" does not
provide much guidance about who is an owner or operator, the
definition does, in several places, mention control over a facility as
a relevant criterion in a determination of owner or operator
status.90
89. See, Daniel E. Feder, The Undefined Parameters of Lessee Liability under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA): A Trap for the Unwary Lender, 19 ENVTL. INST. 257, 276 (Winter
1988).
90. While case law and legislative history offer little guidance about such
decisions, courts have held that under certain circumstances a lessee may come
within the definition of an owner. such decisions, however, have been made
without the formulation of a bright-line test for such instances. What is clear,
though, is that the degree of control over a facility is critical in the court's
determination of whether a lessee is an owner for purposes of CERCLA liability.
In United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984
(D. S.C. 1984), where a lessee was considered an "owner", the court again failed
to establish any concrete standards for when a lessee will come within the
definition of an owner under CERCLA, but two criteria for such ownership were
apparent: 1) if an objective observer would conclude that, due to the lessee's
activity on the facility, the lessee is the owner of the facility, or 2) if a lessee
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Thus, evidence of the requisite degree of control necessary
to establish owner/operator status of a lessee is often achieved
through proof that the lessee has been involved in the disposal of
hazardous waste on the facility. The innocent lessee poses a much
different question. Indeed, if the land is the contaminated
"facility," the lessee who controls a new building on the land may
have little control over the land itself. And though the lessee has
a contractual relationship with the owner, that owner is an immune
party and, arguably, no liability could attach to the lessee. This
issue deserves further investigation.
If a state municipal immunity were enacted in New
York,9' it should at least allow a transfer of immunity by lease.
One possibility might be a provision which provides for such a
form of immunity if the acquisition of the property by the
municipality and the transfer of possessory interest to the lessee are
done in conjunction with a special cleanup program which reserves
monitoring and regulatory powers over the lessee to the
municipality and is done in accordance with DEC criteria.
The best course of action for Erie County is to support state
legislation that creates an appropriate exemption from liability for
municipalities when title is acquired either voluntarily or
involuntarily, including both tax foreclosures and eminent domain.
It may be more realistic that an exemption will be granted merely
to the involuntary transfers, but New York may choose to enact
sublets a facility, then the court may treat the lessee as the owner of the facility
for CERCLA purposes. As a practical guideline, however, in determining
whether a lessee has sufficient control over a facility to be an owner under
CERCLA there are the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
distinguishing between capital leases and operating leases. In the former, the
lessee is deemed the owner of the leasehold property for accounting purposes,
while in the later they are not. Most likely, even if courts do adopt the GAAP
formulation of a capital lease, GAAP will permit the courts to engage in a case-
by-case examination to determine if a lessee is in substance the owner of a
facility.
91. A legislative proposal for municipal immunity was introduced in the State
Senate. S.B. 7784, 215th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. 1994 New York Laws. The
precise language of this proposal is not necessarily what we would recommend.
19951
114 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3
legislation similar to Minnesota's, which also exempts voluntary
title transfers through eminent domain. Any such legislation must
ensure that municipalities are not expected to assume the financial
responsibility for cleaning up property for which they had no role
in polluting.
Next, there should be a provision which allows this
immunity to be transferred to the private sector through sale or
lease in order for redevelopment of the brownfield. Although
complicated and untested, it may in fact be possible to transfer
federal municipal immunity through the use of lease agreements.
As with other immunity transfers, this situation will be simplest
and least risky if the land is presently clean.
VI. ENCOURAGING BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT
THROUGH FINANCIAL INCENTVES
Financial incentives are an integral part of encouraging
economic development and bringing industry back to the cities.
Although brownfield sites have traditionally been viewed as an
environmental problem, they also must be viewed as a public
economic development issue. The fear of purchasing these sites
has resulted in stagnated development of urban centers across the
state and across the country. Practically speaking, the benefits of
doing business in the city have been outweighed by the risks
attached to purchasing brownfield sites. Governmental financial
incentives are, therefore, necessary to recycle urban industrial land.
As such, they meet a policy objective that is crucial to the long
term environmental and economic health of the entire region
surrounding such an area.
A proactive approach must be taken in order to tip the
scales of the risk-benefit analysis back toward urban
redevelopment. As previously discussed, relieving potential
purchasers from the weight of uncertain liability is one step toward
balancing this equation. Environmental assessment and even
minimal clean-ups will, however, remain a cost to potential
developers. Adding financial incentives to the benefits side of
brownfield purchases may be the key to inducing redevelopment of
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New York's urban centers.
The catalytic effect of financial incentives has been
emphasized by many other states with urban redevelopment
goals.92 Voluntary cleanup and land recycling bills, such as those
proposed in Michigan, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, include a
combination of releases from liability and financial incentives for
redevelopment. 93 The important point is that the problem must be
addressed in a comprehensive fashion, as part of an overall
brownfield redevelopment strategy that recognizes voluntary
cleanup programs as only one component.
Some states that enacted liability release provisions later
found it necessary to interpret or amend their laws to include
financial incentives for voluntary cleanups.94  For example,
Michigan law already provides for covenants not to sue in
appropriate cases.95  However, there are various Michigan
legislative proposals to include financial incentives for
environmental investigation and assessment. 96
New York no longer can afford to watch its urban centers
decay while other states are attracting businesses, removing the
barriers to redevelopment and rejuvenating the industrial heartland
of their cities. The seeds of what could be an effective overall
strategy have already been planted in the state legislature and the
governor's office.
92. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115B.01-.24(West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
116T.551-.557 (West 1994).
93. H.R. 4720, 87th Leg., Regular Sess., 1993 Michigan Laws; S.972, 178th
Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. 1993 Pennsylvania Laws; S.1036, 205th Leg., 2d
Sess., 1993 New Jersey Laws.
94. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 299.614 (1992).
95. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 299.614a(3).
96. S.659, 87th Leg., Regular Sess., 1993 Michigan Laws; H.R. 4720, 87th
Leg., Regular Sess., 1993 Michigan Laws.
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The recent pilot program97 to redevelop abandoned
industrial sites puts New York back on the right track toward
fighting this type of urban blight. This program recognizes that
combining relief from inappropriate liability with requirements of
positive economic impact and job creation is the best approach.
Perhaps most important is the realization that for any program to
be successful, it must include incentives for recycling the land.
Specifically, the initial proposal discussed possible
assistance from the Urban Development Corporation for business
expansion loans, infrastructure investment loan/grant combinations
and/or grants to assess the nature and the extent of contamination.
Although no money was allocated to cover cleanup costs, the
initiative does address two of the major barriers to redevelopment:
(1) the cost of environmental assessments; and (2) the uncertainty
associated with potential cleanup costs on contaminated property.
This recognizes the important role that financial assistance can play
in a brownfield redevelopment strategy. This is a useful and cost
effective incentive approach because the perceived risk of
redevelopment is high, while the actual contamination may be low,
requiring only minimal cleanup costs.
Because the key to a successful brownfield redevelopment
program lies with its combination of solutions, the key to financial
incentives may lie with a combination of sources. While the pilot
program proposal mentioned some possible incentives and sources
of funds, a combined incentive and financing approach would have
to be utilized in order to sustain a long term program.
New York should include enhanced incentives as part of its
strategy for redevelopment of sites located within the most
economically challenged areas of the state. For example,
depending on the location of the site, the "positive economic
impact" approach could be utilized long term by offering differing
levels of low-interest to no-interest loans combined with grants and
tax abatements. In this respect, designation as a "distressed
community", an "enterprise community" or an "enterprise or
empowerment zone" could mean the ability to offer greater
97. See discussion, supra notes 57-58.
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incentives to companies that agree to bring job opportunities
into the community.
An example of this approach is a proposed Michigan law
providing that grants will only be issued to developers if the
property has "demonstrable economic development potential" and
is located in an "eligible community." 98 The bill looks to such
factors as population density, unemployment rate and those
previously recognized in Michigan's Neighborhood Enterprise Zone
Act.99 The most depressed economic communities, therefore, can
get priority status for redevelopment funds.
The Ohio Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zones Act of 19821°°
provides for tax abatement agreements which state that "a company
will not have to pay the full amount of new taxes on a new
investment for a designated time period if it commits to job
creation or retention. Tax abatement can be for 75% on real and/or
personal property for up to ten years in an unincorporated area and
100% on real and/or personal property for up to ten years in
municipalities." 0 '
Minnesota uses a variety of priorities to determine eligibility
for grant money from its Contaminated Site Cleanup and
Development Account. These include: (1) the highest potential for
increasing tax base of local taxing jurisdictions relative to the fiscal
needs of the jurisdictions as a result of developments that will
occur because of completion of response action; (2) the social
value to the community of the cleanup and redevelopment of the
site; and (3) the amount of commitment of municipal or other local
resources to pay for the cleanup costs. 02
98. H.R. 4720, 87th Leg., Regular Sess.1993 Michigan Laws.
99. MicH. COMP. LAws § 207.772 (1993).
100. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5709.61-5709.66 (Anderson 1993).
101. Cuyahoga County Report, supra note 4, at 40; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5709.62(c) and § 5709.63(A) (Anderson 1993).
102. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.555 (West 1992).
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New York State must continue its recognition of the validity
and necessity of using economic development funds as part of an
overall approach to the brownfield problem. The following is a
synopsis of selected possible funding sources, financial incentives
and implementation mechanisms. One focus of these incentives
rests on allowing interested companies to assess the nature and the
extent of contamination, if any, that exist on a proposed
redevelopment site. In turn, this will offer companies an early and
clear layout of the necessary cleanup and cleanup costs required for
redevelopment of a proposed site.
A. Environmental Funds
Environmental Bond Acts. In New York State, the primary
funding source for environmental cleanups is the Environmental
Quality Bond Act (EQBA). As a funding source, bond acts are
not structured for long term use. Instead, such acts offer a short
term funding mechanism for specific projects and are subject to
voter approval. As of April 1, 1993, $296.8 million of New York's
1986 Environmental Quality Bond Act funds were obligated for
investigation and remedial activities at 552 sites.0 3 Although a
balance of $803.2 million (73 percent of the total 1.1 billion)
remains, the rate of obligation of funds is projected to increase
dramatically over the next few years because many sites are
reaching the more expensive construction phase. °4 Further, the
DEC projects that the EQBA funds could be fully obligated
sometime in the late 1990's.105
For this reason, it is not likely that money will be allocated
for early assessment of sites not already on the state registry.
However, an estimated cost of cleanup for low-level contaminated
sites, such as those classified on the registry as level 4 or level 5
103. N.Y.S. DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERV., NEW YORK STATE HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITE REMEDIAL PLAN at 17-18 (1993).
104. Id. at 29.
105. Id at 29-30.
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sites, may be achieved without much greater commitment from
DEC.1°6 Moreover, some of the unclassified 2a sites may, upon
further investigation, be found to require a minimal cleanup, the
cost of which could be assessed with EQBA funds.
Consequently, there may be some cases where prospective
innocent purchasers might voluntarily come forward and agree to
perform the cleanup as long as the contamination is minimal and
the cost can be assessed before purchase. In these cases, bond act
monies would be conserved, since the company rather than DEC
would be paying for the actual cleanup.
B. Revolving Loan Funds
State Revolving Loan Funds. The designated purpose of
this type of fund would be to help provide funding to persons
undertaking an environmental study of a site as part of a voluntary
cleanup program and for implementing a DEC approved voluntary
cleanup plan.' 7 The proposed financial incentives would be in
the form of low-interest loans and/or grants to cover a percentage
of the costs incurred during completion of an environmental
assessment.'08
If grant money is to be used as a financial incentive, certain
limitations should be attached. For example, grants rather than
loans could be used to investigate and determine whether property
within a distressed community, an enterprise community or zone,
or an empowerment zone, contains environmental contamination.
If the site was found to be contaminated, the grant money could
also be used to characterize the nature and extent of the
contamination and to estimate the cost of cleanup. As discussed in
the UDC pilot program proposal, further requirements for grant
106. For the definitions of site classifications, see Id. at 4.
107. Cuyahoga County Report, supra note 4, at 34-35.
108. See e.g. H.R. 972, 178th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. 1993 Pennsylvania
Laws (establishes Voluntary Cleanup Loan Fund and Industrial Land Recycling
Fund); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.551-.557 (West 1992).
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issuance, such as a positive economic impact on the community
and job creation, could be mandated.
A plan to allow the Urban Development Corporation to
assist companies with business expansion loans or an infrastructure
investment loan/grant combination could be applied over the long
term by using a revolving loan fund program. The monies received
as repayment of outstanding loans would be deposited back into the
revolving fund and any interest earned by monies in the fund
would remain in the fund.
County Revolving Loan Funds. A county revolving loan
fund could be created by combining many different sources
available to a county from both federal and state programs. 9
For example, the Cuyahoga County Working Group proposed the
establishment of such a fund with capitalization from sources such
as "Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) and Urban
Development Action Grant (UDAG) repayments, and from local
revenue sources, such as real estate transfer fees, the general fund,
reserve accounts, as well as grants and borrowing from the Ohio
Water Development Authority (OWDA), State Revolving Loan
Fund, and other sources." 110 The primary purpose of the fund
would be "to expedite projects by trading public dollars for a
shortening of time required for development...it would be the
primary mechanism for short term, dynamic redevelopment
situations, as well as medium and longer term projects which are
important to strategic local objectives.""'
For Erie County purposes, although UDAG funds may no
longer be an available source of funds in New York, the utilization
of money from other sources should be further investigated. For
example, the permissible uses of CDBG funds may require further
109. We recognize that there may be a problem with creating such a county
loan fund in New York because of the prohibition on gifts and loans in the New
York State Constitution. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1986).
110. Cuyahoga County Report, supra note 4 at 20.
111. Id. at 28.
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interpretation by HUD. Specifically, a finding that environmental
assessments could fit under either the "special economic
development activities"' 112  or "basic eligible activities" ' 3
clauses of the CDBG program. This could allow for partial
allocation of those funds into a revolving loan fund program.
Since environmental assessments are already required under
the CDBG program, this use of funds may not be problematic.
However, consideration should be given to the fact that there is a
20 percent spending cap on CDBG "planning" funds and a 30
percent cap on funds used to reduce "slum or blight." Possibly, if
funds were targeted for potential purchasers agreeing to bring jobs
to the county, these caps would not apply because the funds could
be designated as project/program delivery costs. Thus, the CDBG
program is a potential funding resource that should be investigated
further.
Funds from the Regional Economic Development Grant and
Industrial Infrastructure Development Programs 114 may also be
used to capitalize a county revolving loan fund. After the fund is
capitalized, the terms and conditions of any loans and/or grants
could be established and administered at the county level.
C. Tax Abatements
Generally, this type of incentive allows for the full or partial
exemption from taxes (tangible personal property and/or real estate)
on new investment. The Cuyahoga County Report recommended
that the tax abatement authority in Ohio statutes "be extended to
include tax abatement for increased real estate value due to
environmental remediation and subsequent redevelopment.
Additionally, tangible personal property taxes on redeveloped
112. 24 C.F.R. § 570.203 (1994).
113. 24 C.F.R. § 570.201 (1994).
114. N.Y.ECON.DEv.LAWv., Art.11 and 13 (McKinney).
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brownfield sites should be eligible for abatement.""1 5
Minnesota law already provides for redevelopment project
tax abatements. The governing body may exempt from all local
taxes "up to 50 percent of the net tax capacity of development
which represents an increase over the net tax capacity of the
property, including both land and improvements, acquired for the
development at the time of its original acquisition for
redevelopment purposes...The tax exemption shall not operate for
more than ten (10) years." 116
Similarly, the New York Real Property Tax Law presently
allows for certain types of tax exemptions. For example, it
provides that for an economic development zone exemption, "the
base amount of the exemption shall be the extent of the increase in
assessed value attributable to such construction, alteration,
installation or improvement...01 7  The law also provides
"Business Investment Exemptions" for cities with a population
under one million.118  As noted in the state law, certain
exemptions and their duration may be affected by local law,
ordinances or resolutions and should be investigated further. 1 9
Still, brownfields redevelopment seems particularly suited to tax
abatement consideration because it specifically addresses property
that otherwise is unlikely to have a full tax assessment value or,
even any assessment value at all.
115. Cuyahoga County Report, supra note 4, at 31. Ohio has recently enacted
a very broad tax abatement provision in conjunction with its new voluntary
cleanup statute. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.D1-.99 and § 5709.87 (Baldwin
1994). We are not endorsing this particular legislation as a model for New York.
116. MINN.STAT. ANN. § 469.043 (West 1994).
117. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW, § 485(e)(2)(McKinney 1995).
118. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW, § 485(b) (McKinney 1995).
119. See e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 485(b)(7)-(12) and § 485(e)(1-a)
(McKinney 1995).
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D. Tax Increment Financing
The Cuyahoga County Report describes tax increment
financing as a "method of financing capital improvements through
bonded debt repaid with revenue from increased tax assessment
occasioned by the new infrastructure development...The funds are
raised by diverting part of the regularly assessed property taxes to
special project accounts."120 Basically, the revenues would go to
the area's general fund and then, as the taxes increased, the funds
would be transferred to special funds for financing infrastructure
improvements.
This type of financing has been used for a specifically
defined geographical area. As noted in the Cuyahoga County
report, one city created a tax increment financing district including
some possibly contaminated area. The report states that, "the City
assumed liability and then reduced property values in these areas
to reflect market value after discovery of contamination. Once the
tax increment is initiated and funds collected to pay for a portion
of the costs, property value and economic activity will
increase.,
121
The statutory authority in New York will have to be
researched further in order to assess the viability of this type of
financing. Certainly, this seems to be a much longer term
approach to financing than was anticipated in the original proposal
for the UDC pilot program. Yet it is precisely the type of creative
approach that needs to be explored in the larger context of a
comprehensive brownfield strategy.
120. Cuyahoga County Report, supra note 4, at 38.
121. Id. The Cuyahoga County report identifies the city as Kansas City, but it
should be Wichita, Kansas. See Kathleen M. Martin, Siting on Contaminated
Property: Development and Cleanup through Public Private Cooperation 7 NAT.
RFs. & ENV. 20, 21-22 (Winter 1993).
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VII. PROPOSALS FOR BROWNFIELD
RECYCLING IN ERIE COUNTY
1. Erie County should develop an inventory of Brownfield
sites and actively pursue inclusion of the most suitable sites in pilot
programs and other remediation initiatives.
2. State legislative changes which would offer appropriate
liability releases to prospective purchasers of minimally
contaminated Brownfield sites should be developed and supported.
3. State legislative changes encouraging certainty in New York
State cleanup standards should be developed and supported.
4. State legislative changes granting liability exemptions for
land secured by municipalities through tax foreclosure and possibly
eminent domain should be developed and supported.
5. State legislative changes sanctioning the transfer of
municipal immunity to an innocent purchaser should be developed
and supported.
6. The practicality and possibility of lease arrangements with
innocent developers for municipally owned property should be
further investigated.
7. Erie County should consider creating a county-level
revolving loan fund and other financial devices to be used as a
catalyst for brownfield redevelopment. Such funds could be
designated for specific purposes, such as preliminary environmental
assessments or for assistance to small businesses.
8. Allocation of economic development funds for support of
brownfield redevelopment should be encouraged.
9. A coordinated and cooperative effort by economic
development agencies and environmental groups working together
on brownfield redevelopment should be facilitated.
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10. A local brownfields redevelopment program should be
established. Initially, this could be as simple as designating one
existing official to coordinate communication and facilitate
implementation of proposals. As soon as possible, funds should be
sought to create a new office or position charged with this
responsibility. It could perhaps be done in the form of a graduate
internship or similar cooperative effort with the local academic
community.
11. Contacts with other brownfield redevelopment programs and
initiatives around the country should be continued and expanded to
ensure the full exchange of information and ideas.
i
12. A series of meetings, conferences or seminars for business
leaders, insurers, educators, environmental groups, the media,
lenders, government agencies, community groups and the general
public should be organized. These could assist in the exchange of
information and the correction of misperceptions. A regular
newsletter could be published and circulated to all concerned or
interested parties.
13. As soon as is feasible, Erie County and the City of Buffalo
should sponsor a task force with as diverse representation as
possible to address the problem of building a regional consensus on
how to approach the brownfields problem in this area. This model
has been successfully used in Cleveland and is being employed in
Chicago. The unique local dimensions of the problem must be
carefully evaluated.
These proposals are made to address some of the specific
problems discussed in this report. They are broad in scope and
general in nature, but can be enlarged upon or adapted as the need
arises. Not included are proposals that deal with substantive
barriers that weren't discussed in this report. Additional proposals
could address subjects such as: insurance protection (public or
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private) against landowner liability; 22 development of a local
registry of sites identified as suitable for redevelopment;
development of a land banking program; and establishment of a
collection of resource materials to be kept in a central local
depository (such as the Buffalo and Erie County Public Library).
Like the contents of the rest of this report, this list of
proposals is meant to be a starting point for further discussion and
a catalyst for further action. The brownfields problem is a complex
one that calls for careful answers. There are no quick fixes, no
simple solutions. The job of reversing the decline of the urban
core and recycling potentially useful industrial sites is a job that
calls for extensive coordination and communication from all
segments of the community, particularly business owners,
government officials and environmentalists.
These and other proposals should be discussed and
considered on an ongoing basis. The authors of this report want it
to be clear that the proposals presented here are meant only as a
starting point, one that will lead to active brownfield recycling as
a continuing process in Erie County.
VIII. THE CHALLENGE AHEAD
This report has addressed many of the barriers to re-use of
minimally contaminated industrial sites. The recycling of such
industrial sites is essential for long term protection of the
environment because it ensures that land which has already been
used for industrial purposes will be cleaned and used again.
Failure to adequately implement a successful brownfield re-use
strategy will result in land which not only sits idle, but which never
is properly cleaned, thereby exposing urban residents to more
122. Since the original presentation of this report a member of the Fall, 1994
Environment and Development seminar, Eric M. Falkenberry, has conducted
research on the subject of insurance, much of which is contained in "Testimony"
supra note 7.
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environmental risks than they would be exposed to if the land were
successfully put back into use.
Strategies for the re-use of industrial sites must also serve
as an essential component in the economic redevelopment of the
depressed urban core. Redevelopment of industrial areas can
provide jobs for urban residents as well as increase the tax bases
of areas where property values have plummeted. Finally,
brownfield redevelopment initiatives can save municipalities and
counties money by ensuring that the infrastructure already in place
in most urban and industrial areas will be put back to active use.
A number of other cities, particularly Chicago and
Cleveland, already have numerous municipal and regional planners
as well as legislators, working together to create legislation and
petition for federal funding to research and resolve the brownfield
crisis. The state of Minnesota has been addressing and legislating
brownfields redevelopment initiatives for a number of years. The
state of Wisconsin has drafted comprehensive legislation which
specifically focuses on abandoned and tax delinquent industrial
sites in municipal areas. Even the federal government is now fully
acknowledging that Superfund legislation has had a negative impact
on urban industrial areas. It appears to be willing to provide
financial assistance to localities that work toward creative and
sustainable solutions. 123 It would be a shame, and a surprise, if
New York State and the City of Buffalo missed the opportunity to
benefit from the current state of affairs and fell behind their Great
Lakes counterparts.
This report serves only as a first step in addressing the legal
barriers to redeveloping the growing number of abandoned and
decaying properties in Western New York. The report has not
fully addressed all problems associated with brownfields
redevelopment, and further study of specific issues, such as lender
liability, is necessary in the quest for a long term solution.
123. EPA has developed a Brownfield Economic Redevelopment Initiative.
Three cities have already received funds for demonstration projects and more will
be chosen. See, Statement of EPA Assistant Administrator Elliot P. Laws at
Conference of the National Council of Urban Economic Development on
"Environmental Redevelopment" (Sept. 26, 1994).
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Successful strategies can only be adopted by cooperation
and effort on the part of government officials, city planners and
environmental organizations. The City of Buffalo, Erie County,
the New York State Legislature, the Department of Environmental
Conservation and Region Two of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency should all be targeting brownfields
redevelopment strategy. There is no "quick fix" to this problem,
particularly if cleanups are to be conducted with the utmost
attention to the health and safety of the public, and if money is not
to be spent frivolously. The leaders who eventually find and
implement working solutions to the brownfields crisis will need to
be fully informed. They will have to rely on intense research and
accurate analysis. They will need solid knowledge upon which to
base the courageous decisions they have to make. The authors of
this report, members of the Environment and Development Seminar
at University of Buffalo School of Law, are committed to helping
develop the necessary body of knowledge. This report, they hope,
is a useful first step in the long journey ahead.
